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Abstract Objects are central to perception and our interactions with the world. We
perceive the world as parsed into discrete entities that instantiate particular properties,
and these items capture our attention and shape how we interact with the environ-
ment. Recently there has been some debate about whether the sense of smell allows us
to perceive odours as discrete objects, with some suggesting that olfaction is aspa-
tial and doesn’t allow for object-individuation. This paper offers two empirically
tractable criteria for assessing whether particular objects are exhibited in percep-
tual experience—(1) susceptibility to figure-ground segregation and (2) perceptual
constancies—and argues that these criteria are fulfilled by olfactory perception, and
thus there are olfactory objects. I argue that there are, in fact, two different ways that
olfaction allows for figure-ground segregation. First, I look at various Gestalt grouping
principles, which are thought to govern when features are perceived as grouped into
structured wholes, segregated from everything around them. I argue that these prin-
ciples apply to olfactory experience, providing evidence of non-spatial figure-ground
segregation. Second, I defend the contentious idea that a spatial variety of figure-
ground segregation can also occur in olfaction. To see this, however, we need to look
to empirical evidence showing that tactile stimulation and bodily movements play a
crucial role in olfactory phenomenology. Finally, I draw on empirical evidence and
olfactory phenomenology to argue that there are perceptual constancies in olfactory
experience, allowing us to perceive odours as coherent objects that survive shifts in
our perspectives on the world.
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Introduction
Objects are central to perception and our interactions with the world. We perceive
the world as parsed into discrete entities that instantiate properties, and these items
capture our attention and shape how we interact with the environment. For example,
our visual experience divides the world up into clearly distinguished, meaningful units
like flowers, dogs and chairs. The objects we perceive are key to our understanding of
the world; concepts, beliefs and desires relating to objects are ubiquitous. However, to
understand the nature of these entities, we need to uncover the criteria for perceptual
objecthood. What conditions must be fulfilled for something we perceive to be an
object, as opposed to, say, a range of nebulous, unbounded properties? And could the
sense of smell allow the perception of discrete objects?
Philosophers have claimed that compared to visual perceptions, olfactory experi-
ences are “smudgy” (e.g. Batty 2010a) and do not involve the perception of discrete
objects. Rather, they only allow for the perception of either nebulous olfactory
properties (Matthen 2005) or objects in a very weak sense. These weaker object-
based approaches include a non-phenomenological variety of objecthood from Lycan
(1996, 2000) and an existentially-quantified variety from Batty (2010a, b, 2011,
2014a, b), whereby all olfaction allows us to perceive is that there is an undifferen-
tiated something-or-other in one’s vicinity that instantiates properties (Batty 2010a).
This paper argues against such views in favour of a robust kind of olfactory object-
hood. We experience odours as discrete units that bear properties and retain their
identities through perspectival change. I argue that figure-ground segregation (which
underpins object-individuation) and perceptual constancies (which, I claim, under-
pin object-recognition) are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for this type
of objecthood. Paying attention to Gestalt psychology, the role of bodily movement
and tactile stimulation in olfaction, and olfactory phenomenology, I argue that these
criteria apply to the olfactory case.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 1 provides background on the
debates surrounding the issue of perceptual objecthood. Section 2 offers two empiri-
cally tractable criteria for assessing whether discrete perceptual objects are exhibited
in a given perception—susceptibility to figure-ground segregation and perceptual
constancies. While the importance of these aspects of object perception has been
highlighted elsewhere, I offer a novel argument for the claim that they are individually
necessary and jointly sufficient for objecthood. In Sect. 3, I argue that both figure-
ground segregation and perceptual constancies are exhibited in olfactory perception.
First, in Sect. 3.1, I argue in favour of a kind of non-spatial figure-ground segregation
in smell. Drawing analogies with the other senses, I suggest that the Gestalt group-
ing principles—thought to govern how features are grouped together and segregated
from everything else within the perceptual field—can provide valuable evidence for
a non-spatial form of figure-ground segregation in olfaction. In Sect. 3.2, I argue that
contrary to majority opinion, that there can also be spatial olfactory figure-ground
segregation. To see this, we need to look to empirical evidence showing that tactile
stimulation and bodily movements play a crucial role in olfactory phenomenology.
Finally, in Sect. 3.3, I highlight a number of perceptual constancies exhibited in olfac-
tory experience, considering both olfactory phenomenology and empirical research.
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1 Background
The notion of perceptual objecthood that I will be primarily concerned with in this
paper is a robust phenomenological sense of objecthood: single, discrete entities exhib-
ited in our experience that nonetheless exhibit many distinct properties. For example,
in the case of vision, when we perceive a flower, we perceive it as a single object,
despite it consisting of a long green stem, petals of different colours and so forth. This
relies on our capacity for object individuation—perceptual systems can discern that
groups of features belong to the same individual. Another crucial aspect of perceptual
objecthood is that we perceive objects as remaining constant amid changes in our own
perspective, movements of the objects themselves and, within limits, as they change
over time. As Rüdiger von der Heydt says in a recent review article, “One charac-
teristic of perceptual objects is continuity (object permanence). When an object is
briefly occluded by a foreground object and then reappears, it is perceived as the same
object. A token seems to persist” (2015, p. 6). Likewise, O’Callaghan says: “objects
perceptibly persist and survive changes” (2016, p. 1273). This apparent persistence
of an object is closely connected with our object recognition abilities (see Sect. 2.2
for discussion of the connection between perceptual constancies and object recogni-
tion), which are considered important aspects of object perception. Object recognition
encompasses abilities such as tracking objects, perceiving them as complete objects
despite occlusions or the limitations of our particular perspective (amodal completion),
and perceiving them as persisting through time.
There are interesting regularities between the entities we perceive as objects and
in the particular processes involved in perceiving objects. For example, the Gestalt
psychologists uncovered an array of principles that appear to govern when we perceive
worldly features as grouped together. Some examples of this include: the ‘law of
common fate’, which states that we tend to group together elements that move together;
the laws of similarity and proximity, which say that features perceived as similar
and/or in close proximity are more likely to be perceived as grouped together into
objects; the law of good form, which says that we tend to group together elements
that are coherent, balanced, simple and so forth; and the law of closure, which says
that features are more likely to be perceived as grouped if they are part of a closed
figure (Wertheimer 1923/1938). Researchers have found that many of these regularities
apply not only visual perception but also perceptions via other senses, such as audition
(e.g. Bregman 1990). This motivates some of the discussion of perceptual objecthood
because there are significant similarities in how we perceive and parse the world via
our different senses, suggesting that there may be a notion of objecthood applicable
to non-visual perception. Here I aim to find non-visuocentric necessary and sufficient
conditions for a robust notion of perceptual objecthood. The Gestalt principles—as
formulated by Wertheimer—are not themselves suitable for this, because they are
defeasible (involving a ceteris paribus clause) and seem to be neither necessary nor
sufficient for object-perception. However, as we shall see in Sect. 3, they still provide
strong evidence of figure-ground segregation.
Although a number of researchers have considered whether we perceive objects
through non-visual modalities such as audition (e.g. Kubovy and Van Valkenburg
2001; Griffiths and Warren 2004; Matthen 2010), taste (Stevenson 2014), and smell
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(for detailed discussions see Lycan 1996; Batty 2010a, 2011, 2014a, b; Carvalho 2014;
Young 2016),1 most discussions of objecthood still centre on the visual case, which is
often taken to be paradigmatic of object perception. Perhaps this is in part because in
the visual case these perceived objects are mainly ordinary, three-dimensional objects.
When we look at a red ball, rather than merely seeing features such as redness and
roundness, we can perceive these features as belonging to an object that is red and
round. Yet even in the visual case, perceptual objects are a broader category than every-
day objects like balls and flowers. O’Callaghan (2016, p. 1274) points out that we see
items such as shadows and rainbows in an object-like way even though they aren’t ordi-
nary material objects. We still see such items as being, like the ball, spatially-arrayed
in our visual field and as exhibiting (relatively) clear boundaries, and as persisting
over time and as we move around. Thus, an adequate phenomenological account of
objecthood ought to allow for such cases.
The challenge of providing a satisfactory account of objecthood is even more pro-
nounced when considering the sense of smell. In contrast to the visual case, it is
controversial whether we perceive olfactory objects at all. Our olfactory perceptions
are unlike our visual perceptions in that they don’t seem to present us with items with
clear, sharply distinguished edges. Thus, it is not immediately clear whether olfac-
tion could allow the perception of discrete objects, and as we shall see, there is little
consensus on this issue.
Moreover, there are a number of potential complications in arguing in favour of
olfactory objecthood. For example, an initial problem is to decide what sort of objects
we could perceive via olfaction. There are two main candidates for olfactory object-
hood: the distal object (e.g. the rose) or the volatile chemicals/odour (e.g. the rose
odour). There are good reasons, discussed in detail elsewhere (e.g. see Lycan 1996;
Batty 2010a; Richardson 2013; Young 2016) to suspect that we do not directly perceive
the rose itself through olfaction. We can smell a rose scent without having to be in the
direct vicinity of a rose, and a rose scent may persist after the rose itself is removed
or destroyed. It is also possible to give rise to a rose scent artificially—say, through
a rose-scented air freshener. It would be strange to say that our perceptions in such
cases are non-veridical because of the lack of an actual rose. Thus, the most common
view among those who endorse an object-based account is the immediate objects that
we perceive through olfaction are odours, rather than source objects. It is sometimes
added that we can still indirectly perceive the source objects via the perception of
the odour (Lycan 1996; see also Cavedon-Taylor forthcoming for a review of these
issues). While the issue of whether source objects are represented in olfactory percep-
tion is important in determining the intentional objects of olfaction, here my concern
is whether we immediately perceive odours as objects in a phenomenological sense
(which will be spelled out in Sect. 2). My claim is that for odours to count as objects
in this sense, they must be perceived as discrete entities, which instantiate properties
and survive shifts in perspective. I remain neutral on the question of whether olfaction
may also involve an indirect representation of source objects, and shall not discuss
these issues further as they are orthogonal to the issues at hand. For the purposes of
1 See also briefer remarks on such issues from Peacocke (1983) and Matthen (2005).
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this paper I shall assume that if we immediately perceive objects through olfaction,
these objects are odours. This assumption is shared in the key literature that I discuss
throughout this paper (e.g. Lycan 1996, 2000; Wilson and Stevenson 2003, 2006,
2007; Batty 2010a, 2011, 2014a, b; Carvalho 2014).
A second, related complication is that even if we agree that it is odours rather than
source objects that we directly perceive through olfaction, there is some debate on
the nature of these odours. For the purposes of this paper, I will follow philosophers
such as Lycan (1996) and Roberts (2015) in taking an odour to be a molecular cloud
of volatile particles, which may instantiate olfactory properties such as smokiness,
sweetness, and so forth. I shall not discuss the nature of odours further in this paper
(see Cavedon-Taylor forthcoming for an in-depth discussion), but it is worth noting
that not all parties in the debates about olfaction share the same idea of what an odour
is.
The theorists that I shall discuss in detail in this paper all endorse world-directed
accounts of olfaction. However, it is worth noting that this is itself somewhat con-
troversial and some philosophers have claimed that our olfactory experiences may be
merely sensational; i.e. olfaction only makes us aware of properties of our own expe-
riences rather than properties of, or objects in, the world. The clearest example of this
comes from a brief but suggestive remark from Peacocke: “a sensation of…[smell]
may have no representational content of any sort, though of course the sensation will
be of a distinctive kind” (1983, p. 5). Others have claimed that the phenomenology of
olfaction is in accordance with the sensation-based view, even if the sensation-based
view is inaccurate for other reasons (e.g. Lycan 1996). With a sensation-based view,
we do not perceive objects or worldly features in the case of olfaction; there are in fact
no worldly entities to which we attend when we smell, as sensations are non-world
directed. Most researchers, however, seem keen to accommodate olfaction in world-
directed accounts of perception, rejecting the sensation-based view.2 There have been
a number of different world-directed approaches to olfaction.
The first world-directed approach to smell is the feature-based view. Those that
endorse this approach concede that olfaction is world-directed, but claim that what we
olfactorily perceive are not objects but only properties or features (see Matthen’s brief
discussion of olfaction in 2005, pp. 284–285 for such an account). We don’t smell the
fruitiness, smokiness and maltiness of a coffee as bound together, but instead simply
perceive these properties, free of any particular object. Matthen says that smells, “have,
at best, a primitive—that is, an undifferentiating—feature-location structure—every
smell of which I am aware is simply here” (p. 284). He adds that olfactory content
“does not come in object-attribute form” (ibid.). This sort of feature-based approach
has also traditionally been dominant within olfactory science, where the primary goal
has been to understand olfaction by identifying how different features of a chemical
stimulus are represented in olfactory experience.3 However, the tides are turning in
2 Here I use the term “world-directed” to refer to any theory of perception that takes worldly entities to
be accessible or represented through our experience. This would cover varieties of representationalism and
relationalism (such as direct realism). I intend my discussion in this paper to be neutral between these
different approaches.
3 See Wilson and Stevenson (2006) for an in-depth discussion of this model of olfactory experience.
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the olfactory sciences and an object-based approach to olfaction, advocated by Wilson
and Stevenson (2006, 2007), has recently gained in popularity. Wilson and Stevenson
(2006) argue that an object-based approach can make sense of a growing body of data
from neurobiology and psychology. In particular, they think an object-based approach
better accounts for the behavioural evidence and for the need to perceive biologically
salient groups of odorants amid changing olfactory stimulation (p. 1892).
Among the object-based approaches to olfaction, there are wide ranging views.
First is the abstract view, endorsed by Batty (2010a, 2011). This view is similar to that
of Matthen (2005), but allows for a weak, existentially quantified form of olfactory
objecthood. For Batty, olfactory experience only ever involves the representation that
there is something-or-other in one’s vicinity, instantiating olfactory properties. She
argues that we never attribute olfactory properties to particular objects, and there
cannot be any object-individuation in the case of olfaction. A coffee smell and a
lemon smell perceived concurrently won’t be experienced as individuated objects but
simply properties instantiated by something or other “here”. In this paper, I will argue
in favour of a much stronger notion of olfactory objecthood—one in which smelling
does allow us to parse the olfactory world into individuated objects. We perceive
particular (rather than existentially quantified) olfactory objects.
Lycan (1996, 2000) also endorses a weak variety of olfactory objecthood. For
Lycan, there are olfactory objects in the sense that our olfactory experience represents
odours—and an odour is “a vaporous emanation, a diffusing collection of molecules
typically given off from a definite physical source… they are public physical entities
available for sensing by anyone who happens, fortunately or unfortunately, by” (1996,
p. 91). Like Batty, however, he does not allow for the representation of discrete objects
in experience. His account is based upon the idea that taking olfaction to represent
odours—public physical entities—allows us to best account for the olfactory correct-
ness conditions discussed above; an experience of a rose smell is veridical just in
case there is a rose odour in one’s vicinity, regardless of whether there is also a rose
nearby. Yet he thinks that this sort of world-directed object perception is not appar-
ent on phenomenological grounds. In fact, he thinks that “phenomenally speaking, a
smell is just a modification of our consciousness, a qualitative condition or quale…
in us, lingering uselessly in the mind without representing anything” (1996, p. 90).
In what follows, I shall argue in favour of a kind of phenomenological objecthood
in olfaction—we perceive odour-objects that exhibit figure-ground segregation and
perceptual constancies.
Both the feature-based and weaker object-based approaches are largely motivated
by the apparent paucity of spatial information associated with olfactory experiences, as
compared to other senses. Vision—which is taken to provide the paradigmatic example
of object-perception—allows us to differentiate objects and understand their spatial
relations with one another and to our own bodies. We see objects as spatially extended
and bounded entities, arrayed within the visual field. In contrast, among theorists on
all sides of the debate regarding olfactory objects, there is a common suspicion that
olfactory perception is aspatial (e.g. Lycan 2000; Wilson and Stevenson 2006) or spa-
tially undifferentiated (Matthen 2005; Batty 2011, 2014b; Carvalho 2014). Carvalho
(2014) and Wilson and Stevenson (2006) agree that smell is aspatial, but think that it
is possible to perceive individuated objects in a non-spatial manner, while theorists
123
Synthese (2019) 196:4279–4303 4285
such as Batty (2010a, b) and Matthen (2005) treat spatial differentiation as a prereq-
uisite for object-individuation. This idea that spatiality is key to object individuation
is quite intuitive given the primacy of vision within perceptual research; in vision, we
segregate objects based on spatial locations and their spatially situated edges. Thus,
if olfaction fails to be adequately spatially differentiated, this may give prima facie
credence to a feature-based or a weak object-based approach (although as we shall
see, there are legitimate non-spatial types of figure-ground segregation).
Some such as Carvalho (2014) and Wilson and Stevenson (2003, 2006, 2007) offer
stronger accounts of object-perception, taking olfactory experience to present to us
particular odour-objects individuated on the basis of their chemical structure. While
my own view is more closely aligned with these approaches, both Carvalho and Wilson
and Stevenson agree with Batty and Lycan that olfaction does not allow for spatial
discrimination of odours, and as we shall see, their arguments for the individuation
of odours are alone insufficient to counter Batty’s objections. In what follows, I will
argue that odours can be individuated both in an aspatial manner based on Gestalt
grouping principles and in a spatial manner when we take into account the role of
bodily movement and tactile stimulation for olfactory phenomenology.
Finally, there have also been criticisms that target the whole dispute between the
different object-based and feature-based approaches. Theorists such as Cooke and
Myin (2011) and Barwich (2014) argue in favour of more process-driven approaches,
accusing philosophers such as Batty and Lycan of taking the phenomenal character
of perceptions to be in some way independent of the processes that give rise to these
experiences, a view that Barwich and Cooke and Myin call the Independence Thesis.
Allegedly, those guilty of endorsing this thesis tend to assume that sensory perceptions
can be understood as static, autonomous units, whose properties may or may not be
correlated to the properties of physical objects. Barwich (2014) argues that we can
understand olfaction without recourse to perceptual objects or properties of objects,
paying attention instead to olfactory processes. I shall not address such views in detail,
but will in Sect. 3.2 illustrate how we can take insights from such approaches, while
still endorsing an object-based account.
In what follows, I shall oppose the feature-based views and the weaker object-based
views of Batty and Lycan, and will argue that there are perceptual objects in olfaction
in a robust sense. Olfaction allows the perception of particular objects, rather than
merely existentially quantified something-or-others in one’s vicinity. I will begin by
providing necessary and sufficient conditions for this robust phenomenological sense
of objecthood before showing that these criteria are fulfilled in olfactory perception.
2 Necessary and sufficient conditions for objecthood
This section argues that figure-ground segregation and perceptual constancies are each
necessary for the perception of particular (rather than merely existentially quantified)
objects, and that they are jointly sufficient. As mentioned above, discrete objects exhibit
boundaries and are able to survive changes in our own perspective, as they move and
(to some extent) over time. These phenomenological features of perception involve
abilities to discern the boundaries of objects (this falls under the category of object
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individuation) and to recognise objects across different viewing conditions and in
different contexts (abilities that are central to object recognition in ways I discuss below
in Sect. 2.1). Whether these abilities are accounted for in one’s theory of objecthood is
a useful test for determining whether we have adequate phenomenological criteria for
object perception; the phenomenology of experience ought not be wholly disconnected
from the skills involved in perception.
Figure-ground segregation is the defining feature of the ability to perceive bound-
aries (object individuation), while perceptual constancies allow perceived objects to
appear invariant across different perspectives and amid changes (underpinning object
recognition abilities). First, I shall look at figure-ground segregation.
2.1 Figure-ground segregation
“Figure-ground segregation” refers to our ability to distinguish figures from back-
grounds. This figure-ground structure is central to our visual experiences: we perceive,
for example, houses against a background of the sky, and books against the background
of a desk. We are unable to take in a whole detailed scene at once due to the limi-
tations of our perceptual access to the world, so we attend to a particular figure or
set of figures at a given time, relegating everything else to background. We perceive
these backgrounds as relatively undifferentiated and less determinate than the figures
themselves.
It has been suggested by Kubovy and Van Valkenburg (2001) that susceptibility
to figure-ground segregation is the defining feature of perceptual objects; it is both
necessary and sufficient for the perception of objects (p. 102). Those features of the
world that become figures for us are perceptual objects. A number of other researchers
have agreed that figure-ground segregation is central to the perception of particular
objects, and have used this criterion to argue both for (e.g. Wilson and Stevenson
2007; Carvalho 2014) and against (e.g. Batty 2011, 2014b) the idea that olfactory
experience could allow for objects in this sense. Part of Kubovy and Van Valkenburg’s
motivation for taking figure-ground separation to be the defining feature of objecthood
is to provide a non-visuocentric account of perceptual objects. Research suggests that
figure-ground segregation is exhibited in non-visual types of sense perception, such
as auditory experience. For example, audition researcher Bregman (1990) claims that
hearing involves the parsing of auditory scenes into distinct auditory streams—which
can be understood as a kind of boundary allocation—and studies show that listeners
are unable to pay attention to more than one sound stream at a time, which is also
indicative of figure-ground segregation. One such study by Bregman and Campbell
(1971) found that perceivers were unable to judge the order of sounds presented
in a repetitive cycle where these sounds were experienced as two distinct streams.
Participants were presented with three high-pitched sounds (ABC) and three low-
pitched sounds (123) in the order A-1-B-2-C-3. However, the majority of participants
experienced the order as either A-B-C-1-2-3 or 1-2-3-A-B-C as they were only able
to pay attention to one stream at a time; one stream at a time is experienced as a figure
against a background. As I shall discuss in Sect. 3.1, this suggests that figure-ground
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segregation need not be a spatial feature of perception and can be applied to non-visual
senses such as audition.
Kubovy and Van Valkenburg are right to avoid a visuocentric notion of per-
ceptual objecthood given the similarities in how we perceive the world through
different senses—e.g. both vision and audition involve figure-ground segregation,
Gestalt grouping principles, and so forth. Figure-ground segregation is at the heart
of ‘object-individuation’, and a successful phenomenological account of object-
perception should highlight the importance of this capacity. Figure-ground segregation
allows us to make sense of the idea that perceptual objects are discrete and have
boundaries. In fact, figure-ground segregation is both necessary and sufficient for
the exhibition in experience of boundaries (which, as suggested by the auditory case
above, need not be spatial): if there is figure-ground segregation, there must be bound-
aries allowing the separation of the figure from background. Likewise, if we perceive
something as having boundaries, this entails that we perceive it as segregated from
everything else around it. Boundedness and figure-ground segregation are two sides of
the same coin. Boundedness (and thus, figure-ground segregation) is certainly neces-
sary for a robust sense perceptual objecthood that goes beyond the mere representation
that there is something or other with olfactory properties in one’s vicinity, but it is less
clear that it is also sufficient. For full-blown perceptual objecthood we also need to
recognise the object as persisting through change, which as we shall see, is crucial
for object-recognition. As mentioned, the standard notion of perceptual objecthood
involves the idea that these entities can—at least to some degree—survive shifts in
our own perspective, movements of the objects themselves and certain changes over
time. I do not think that figure-ground segregation alone gives us this.
Here are two cases in which it seems that figure-ground segregation applies, but
where plausibly there isn’t full-blown object perception. First, imagine the experience
of standing under a railway bridge, looking up at its underside as the train passes by
overhead.4 You perceive flashes of light through the gaps between the tracks as the
carriages pass by. These flashes of light stand out to us against a background of the
environment under the bridge. However, these flashes do not seem to be perceived as
perceptual objects, but merely as differences in lighting that jump out in our experience.
I do not think we ought to include these flashes as examples of perceptual objects,
because if we were to do so, our notion would be extremely weak and wouldn’t
correspond with any normal usage of the term “object”. The notion of objecthood
that I am interested in here is one that involves both object individuation and object
recognition abilities—the two sets of skills considered to be at the heart of object-
perception. Perceiving the flashes doesn’t appear to involve object recognition abilities
such as tracking, amodal completion or the perception of them as persistent. Thus, nor
does it involve perceptual constancies—the flashes aren’t perceived as invariant across
changes in perspective, but are merely transient figures that capture our attention.
A second example in which there seems to be figure-ground segregation without
perceptual objecthood is the experience of an after-image following the perception of
a bright light. After-images appear segregated from everything else we experience,
4 With thanks to Alistair Isaac (personal communication) for providing this example.
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allowing for figure-ground segregation. However, they don’t present themselves to
us as objects in the world, but instead seem overlaid on our visual field, lacking
phenomenal objectivity. They continue to appear to us in whichever direction we look.
Thus we do not perceive after-images as invariant amid changing sensory stimulation,
because no matter how one’s perspective varies, after-images do not provide different
sensory input.
Figure-ground segregation is thus not sufficient for perceptual objecthood; there
are counter-examples to such a theory. Kubovy and Van Valkenburg’s criterion for
perceptual objecthood (susceptibility to figure-ground segregation alone) is too weak
to capture an important aspect of the perception of objects—the perceived entity’s
ability to survive changes of perspective and in the object itself. Adding the criterion
of the exhibition of constancies will provide a more useful notion of objecthood,
which better encapsulates what is generally meant by the term, i.e. something that
persists, which we can track, and so forth. Recall O’Callaghan’s assertion that “objects
perceptibly persist and survive changes” (2016, p. 1273). I shall now discuss the second
criterion for perceptual objecthood—the exhibition of perceptual constancies—which
will provide us with a more robust notion of perceptual objects.
2.2 Perceptual constancies
Contra Kubovy and Van Valkenburg (2001), in my view the exhibition of perceptual
constancies is also necessary for the perception of objects. Perceptual constancies are
the invariances we perceive amid changing sensory stimulation. For example, I can
perceive the invariant size of an object even if my perspective changes, giving rise
to an interesting kind of duality to the experience. Consider Peacocke’s (1983, p. 12)
well-known example of seeing two trees of exactly the same size, one of which is
further away than the other. There is a sense in which one of the trees looks bigger in
that it takes up more space in the visual field, but there is another clear sense in which
the trees are perceived as the same size. The perceiver sees the observer-independent
size of the trees. Similarly, Noë (2004, p. 78) observes that although a plate, in some
sense, looks elliptical from an angle, the viewer also perceives the objective roundness
of the plate. In fact, these observer independent properties are generally much easier
to attend to than perspective-dependent appearances; when I look at a plate, it takes
some effort to notice the elliptical appearance. A novice artist will struggle to recreate
the lines and angles required for an accurate drawing, and may resort to drawing the
plate as round. We are able to detect patterns and invariances as our perspective on the
world shifts. Perceptual constancies are a requirement for coherent object perception.
Part of what it is to perceive an object is to recognise it as the same object from
different perspectives. Without such an ability, our perceptions would be extremely
confusing—as soon as we moved our eyes, the world around us would appear to
change.
Object recognition encompasses a range of skills that are closely connected to these
perceptual constancies. It includes capacities to recognise invariance amid change
along with semantic categorisation. It involves the ability to recognise tokens of the
same type (for example, one might see two tomatoes and recognise a kind of sameness
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among them) and also the ability to perceive objects as the same token object from
one moment to the next. Thus, skills such as tracking etc. are taken as object recog-
nition abilities. This aspect of object-perception has been emphasised by a number
of olfaction researchers (e.g. Wilson and Stevenson 2003, 2006, 2007; Batty 2010a).
Batty’s abstract view takes there to be something akin to object recognition in the case
of olfaction, even though there is no object individuation.
Perceptual constancies underpin our object-recogition abilities such as tracking,
perceiving an object as persistent, and amodal completion. They are needed to perceive
an object as maintaining its identity moment to moment, or to categorise objects as
belonging to a particular type. Consider an example of tracking an object: I watch a
car driving down the street. As I do so, the shape of the car projected onto my retina
continually changes as it moves past and different aspects of the car come into view.
Despite all of these dramatic perspectival changes, I do not perceive the car itself as
changing shape or the colour of the car as changing when the sun reflects off different
parts of it. I perceive the car as an invariant three-dimensional object of a particular
colour moving in a particular direction. Without these constancy effects, it is not clear
that we could track the object amid the flux of changing appearances. Likewise, it
seems that these constancies are crucial in perceiving the object as persisting over
time. I perceive the car as remaining the same object over time, even as my eyes move
and I walk around, and as I see different aspects of the object.
Amodal completion is also closely connected to perceptual constancy. In vision,
amodal completion is the perception of an object as complete even though it is not
entirely visible. As in the previous cases, this seems to involve an ability to go beyond
the immediate sensory evidence to perceive the overall shape of an object. We are
presented with a world of whole, invariant objects rather than simply the facing sides
of objects with which we are in direct sensory contact. Noë (2006) notes that when one
looks at a tomato, although one is only in direct sensory contact with its facing side,
“[t]he visual experience of the tomato, when one takes it at face value, presents itself
to one precisely as a visual experience as of a whole tomato” (p. 413). This is a case of
amodal completion, and one that, according to Noë, depends upon our expectancies
regarding how different aspects of the tomato would come into view if we were to
change our perspective; our grasp of constancies enables the perception of whole
objects despite the limitations of our perspectives. Burge (2010 p. 417) notes that in
both tracking cases and amodal completion cases we “perceptually anticipate” that
which is not strictly speaking present to our senses. This also suggests a commonality
with the constancy cases discussed above. Just as we are able to perceive the round
shape of the plate even though this involves a kind of extrapolation from the immediate
sensory evidence, we are able to perceive the tomato as whole even though we cannot
strictly speaking see all of it at once. Thus, amodal completion is plausibly a special
case of our ability to perceive constant aspects of the world—the object is perceived
as having an invariant, complete shape despite our sensory limitations. We shall see
in Sect. 3.3, that something similar applies in the case of olfaction.
While perceptual constancies are closely connected to object-recognition, there
are some aspects of object-recognition that I am hesitant to include as necessary
for object perception. For example, object recognition is often also taken to involve
implicit object memories—the ability to recognise (at least implicitly) that an object is
123
4290 Synthese (2019) 196:4279–4303
of the same type as a previously experienced object. While object memories are able
to influence the way we categorise objects and seemingly can even influence figure-
ground assignments (e.g. Peterson and Gibson 1994), raising interesting questions
about how object-recognition and object individuation are interlinked, this aspect of
object recognition does not itself appear to be necessary for the perception of objects.
After all, if this were the case, it would not be possible to perceive novel objects of
which no prior memories are stored. Thus, it is the perceptual constancies underpinning
object recognition abilities that are necessary for the perception of objects, rather
than (all aspects of) object-recognition itself. Perceptual constancies are required for
achieving the initial perception of a coherent object along with feats of recognition
such as tracking, persistence, and amodal completion.
Perceptual constancies have been observed across other modalities, and are intimately
tied to the notion of perceptual objects across the senses. Researchers have, for exam-
ple, found various constancies exhibited in auditory perception. It has been observed
that the perception of sound streams involves the phenomenon of timbre constancy.
Bregman (1990) points out:
A friend’s voice has the same perceived timbre in a quiet room as at a cocktail
party. Yet at the party, the set of frequency components arising from that voice is
mixed at the listener’s ear with frequency components from other sources. The
total spectrum of energy that reaches the ear may be significantly different in
different environments. (p. 2)
We recognise invariance of timbre even though there is also a sense in we hear some-
thing quite different in a cocktail party and in a quiet room. Another example is
highlighted by Matthen (2010), who, drawing on the work of neuroscientist and musi-
cian Levitin (2006), notes that melodies retain their identity even if they are played
in a different key. We recognise the sameness of the melodies amid changes. Thus,
Matthen takes them to be analogous to the three-dimensional objects we perceive
through vision, and describes them as a type of auditory object.
Such perceptual constancies are a necessary condition for object-perception. As
noted, without such constancies, we would not be able to recognise an object as
persisting amid change. We would merely experience a barrage of changing sensations
rather than coherent objects. Thus, if it turns out that olfactory experience does not
exhibit such constancies, smell cannot involve the perception of objects in a robust
phenomenological sense. However, perceptual constancies alone are not sufficient
for the perception of objects as there are types of perceptual constancies that apply to
properties, which may not be instantiated by a particular perceived object. In particular,
colour constancy may occur in cases where we do not perceive an object. One such
case is provided by Kennedy (2007), who suggests that where someone is engulfed in
a Ganzfeld fog, although their experience presents to them a uniform, undifferentiated
colour, there may still be cases of colour constancy. “The blue as it is presented to me
in a Ganzfeld fog could seem a bit thicker or smoother while still appearing to be the
same color. In this sort of case, the color character of my experience changes, but I still
seem to be aware of the same color. One’s experience in a color-constancy Ganzfeld-
case would have a significant phenomenological similarity to one’s experience of an
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object’s color as constant” (p. 315). The experience of the fog doesn’t present itself
as of an object, and doesn’t exhibit figure ground segregation, but it can still involve
perceptual constancies.
If a perception involves both boundaries (figure-ground segregation) and constan-
cies, this will be a case of full-blown object-perception in a phenomenological sense.
The joint exhibition of these features in perception ensures that the putative object is
perceived as discrete, bounded and that it is able to survive changes in one’s perspective
and movements of the object itself. This is a much stronger notion of objecthood than
the non-phenomenological notion offered by Lycan and the weak existentially quan-
tified variety offered by Batty, allowing for the perception of particular objects rather
than merely some-or-other undifferentiated object. Using these conditions enables a
robust, non-visuocentric notion of perceptual objecthood, which avoids the counter
examples faced by Kubovy and Van Valkenburg’s (2001) theory. Thus, plausibly sus-
ceptibility to figure-ground segregation and perceptual constancies are jointly sufficient
for the perception of particular objects, as well as individually necessary. If I am right,
then demonstrating that these features of perception are exhibited in olfaction would
show there to be olfactory objects in a robust sense.
3 Does olfaction fulfil the criteria for perceptual objecthood?
Here I will argue that olfactory experiences often exhibit both figure-ground segre-
gation and perceptual constancies—and thus, we perceive discrete objects through
olfaction. As we have seen, figure-ground segregation and perceptual constancies are
each necessary for this kind of perceptual objecthood, and thus, if either is missing
from olfactory experience, this would show that we do not perceive olfactory objects
in a robust phenomenological sense. If there are perceptual constancies but not figure-
ground segregation, this would allow for Batty’s weak abstract variety of object, but
not allow the perception of particular objects.
I will begin by looking at whether there is a figure-ground structure to olfactory
experience. I will suggest that there can be a type of non-spatial figure-ground segre-
gation in olfaction (Sect. 3.1), based on the Gestalt grouping principles, which have
been used to provide evidence for perceptual grouping and segregation in vision and
audition. Secondly, I will argue that there is also a form of spatial figure-ground seg-
regation that applies in the case of smell (Sect. 3.2). Then in Sect. 3.3, I will focus
on perceptual constancies, which are also required for full-blown objecthood. I shall
discuss empirical research and olfactory phenomenology, which suggest that there are
least two types of perceptual constancy exhibited in olfactory experience, and thus,
that olfaction does involve perceptual objects.
3.1 Figure-ground segregation in olfaction: an aspatial notion based on Gestalt
principles
While there has been research into audition suggesting that figure-ground segregation
can occur in a temporal, rather than spatial, manner (Bregman 1990), the phenomenon
is often still described in explicitly spatial terms. For example, Batty (2014b) asserts:
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“In those types of experience in which we think of figure-ground segregation as
achieved—vision, audition and touch, for example—we do so on the basis of the rich-
ness of its spatial representation” (p. 10). Visual experience provides a paradigmatic
example of this kind of rich spatiality, presenting us with clearly bounded, spatially
arrayed objects that we distinguish from each other and from the background. Olfac-
tion doesn’t ostensibly do this and as mentioned above, many researchers consider
olfaction to be aspatial or spatially undifferentiated (Lycan 2000; Matthen 2005; Wil-
son and Stevenson 2006; Batty 2011, 2014b). It therefore remains highly controversial
whether olfaction achieves figure-ground segregation.
Researchers that have argued in favour of olfactory figure-ground segregation
include Wilson and Stevenson (2006, 2007), Carvalho (2014) and Young (2016). Wil-
son and Stevenson (2006, 2007) and Carvalho (2014) have broadly similar accounts of
olfactory figure-ground segregation. They suggest that we should understand figure-
ground segregation in smell as being an ability to perceive an individual odour against
a background of other odorants. Carvalho says: “for one of these odors to be experi-
enced as such, as the odor that it is, the olfactory system needs to be able to extract a
very complex blend against a background of irrelevant odorants and competing olfac-
tory objects” (2014, p. 63). For example, intuitively, when I walk into a coffee shop,
I can perceive a unified coffee odour despite there also being a complex blend of
odorants from cleaning products, food, perfume and so forth. We perceive the coffee
as a “unitary percept” (Wilson and Stevenson 2006), which then stands out against
the other odorants in the air. Batty takes these sorts of arguments to rely on the idea
that the coffee odour has “experiential prominence” (2014a, 2014b), and argues that
her own approach is equally well-placed to explain the experiential prominence of the
coffee smell.
Recall, Batty believes that olfactory experience is just too “smudgy” to involve
bounded, discrete objects. Rather than particular objects, olfactory experience only
represents olfactory properties instantiated by some-or-other object “here” in one’s
vicinity. She takes “here” to be an undifferentiated location, claiming that we do
not distinguish where the smell is instantiated from where it is not (2010a, p. 9).
The content of olfactory experience is thus indexical (in that odours are experienced
as “here”) and abstract in the sense that rather than representing particular objects
they simply represent “that there is something or other here with certain properties”
(Batty 2011, p. 170). She takes olfactory experience itself to be silent on which odour
instantiates which olfactory property (since she denies there is object individuation in
olfaction). If one can smell coffee and perfume, for Batty the experience will merely
report that it smells perfumey and coffee-like here (see 2010a, p. 534; 2011, pp.
166–167). If certain aspects of one’s experience are especially prominent (say the
coffee smell sticks out to the perceiver over the perfumey smell), for Batty, this will
be a case of experiential prominence, which need not be understood as a kind of
figure-ground segregation. This could merely be a case of certain properties being
experienced as more prominent than other properties of some-or-other object, and this
could be explained in terms of attention/expectation, or the mechanisms of learning
and memory, without the need to attribute figure-ground effects and discrete objects
to the experience (2014a, p. 237). Thus, Batty claims that her abstract view is, prima
facie, equally well equipped to explain our olfactory experiences.
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If Batty is right, how ought we decide whether olfactory perception involves figure-
ground segregation? It appears that relying upon experiential prominence, as Wilson
and Stevenson (2006, 2007) and Carvalho (2014) do, will alone not suffice to estab-
lish this. As mentioned, much of the motivation for object-talk in perception is the
interesting set of commonalities among our perceptual processes and the entities we
perceive as grouped. The Gestalt psychologists uncovered a range of principles that
govern when we perceive stimulus features as bounded and discrete (and thus exhibit-
ing figure-ground segregation). These principles may be useful in determining whether
figure-ground segregation is exhibited in the olfactory case because if they apply, this
would suggest that groupings and segregations analogous to those in the other senses
are occurring. A robust notion of olfactory figure-ground segregation ought to bear
a resemblance to the way separations of figure and ground occur in the other senses,
especially as people’s intuitions on this point seem to differ a great deal.
The Gestalt psychologists placed phenomenal experience at the heart of their
approach to the mind. They believed that we do not first experience disjointed sensa-
tions, but rather an organised field of structured wholes, segregated from everything
else around them, and sought to uncover stimulus features that determine how the
perceptual field is organised. Wertheimer (1923/1938) outlined aspects of a stimulus
that influence perceptual organisation, giving rise to a range of grouping principles
such as similarity, proximity, common fate and good form (the law of Prägnanz). For
example, in the case of the principle of similarity: items that are similar in colour,
shape, texture, etc. are more likely to be visually grouped. The Gestalt psychologists
found that these grouping principles exerted a significant influence on the way that
people perceive visual displays (e.g. Wertheimer 1923/1938), and it has been found
that all of these principles are also applicable to auditory perception (e.g. Bregman
1990).
If olfaction only allowed the perception of nebulous properties (Matthen 2005)
or merely the weak sense of existentially quantified objecthood advocated by Batty,
olfactory experience would not involve structured wholes segregated from everything
else around them. If the Gestalt principles of perceptual organisation apply to the
objects/features we perceive through smell, this would be a good reason for describing
olfaction as exhibiting figure-ground segregation. It would demonstrate clear similar-
ities to the pre-established notions of visual and auditory figure-ground segregation,
and would suggest that perceptual organisation in olfaction occurs in ways analogous
to the other senses. In fact, there is evidence that, even disregarding any potential
spatial import in olfactory experience, several of these principles apply.5
5 Other Gestalt principles may well also apply in the olfactory case, but there is limited research in this
area. The principle of common fate says that we are more likely to perceive elements that move together as
being grouped. Bregman (1990, p. 249), however, suggested that this principle can be expanded to include
elements that change together in proportional and synchronous ways. He says that would show this principle
to be applicable to audition, in cases where, for example, two frequency components changed synchronously
by proportional amounts and were therefore likely to be perceived as grouped. Olfactory experiences, like
auditory ones, rely heavily on the temporal extension, unfolding over time in important ways. It would
be interesting to see if something analogous occurs in the case of smell. It is plausible that experiencing
odorants as changing in a synchronous manner would result in a greater likelihood of grouping, but as far
as I am aware there is no research exploring this issue. The applicability of at least some of the principles
does, nevertheless, add empirical support to the view that olfaction involves figure-ground segregation.
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Principle of Similarity The principle of similarity states that we tend to group
similar aspects of a stimulus together. There are some issues in assessing how we
are to determine whether items are similar, but generally it is assumed that parts of a
stimulus that, for example, share the same colour or shape are more similar (at least in
these respects) than those that don’t. For example, in the case of vision, two red dots
are more likely to be grouped into a structured whole than a red and a blue dot. These
sorts of specific cases of similarity are taken to be instantiations of a broader principle
of similarity.6 There is evidence that something analogous is applicable in the case of
olfaction. Research shows that mixtures of similarly smelling components are more
likely to be perceived as having unified, novel olfactory qualities than mixtures of
dissimilar components. In cases where the components smell dissimilar it is generally
easier to individuate them and perceive them as separate than in the cases where the
individual odorants smell similar (Wiltrout et al. 2003; see Young 2016 for further
discussion). This seems to be an instance of perceptual grouping based on similarity,
and lends weight to the idea that figure-ground segregation occurs in olfaction.
Principle of Proximity Another of the Gestalt Principles is the law of proximity,
which states that elements that are closer together are more likely to be perceived
as grouped. Generally, in the visual case, this is simply measured by manipulating
distances between aspects of the input image. For example, studies show that dots
that are clustered closely together are more likely to be perceived as grouped together
into a unified figure (e.g. Compton and Logan 1993). In audition, Bregman (1990)
suggests that an analogue of this is separation in time (p. 19). One manifestation of
this principle in audition is that concurrent onset of sounds provides a good indication
that they are members of the same stream, while different start times can signal different
streams (O’Callaghan 2008, p. 822). Separation in time seems to also be relevant in the
olfactory case, as there is evidence that suggests that (as in audition) concurrent onset
of olfactory stimuli increases the chance of us perceiving them as belonging together.
Studies show that in multimodal flavour-smell interactions, simultaneous onset makes
them more likely to be integrated (Pfeiffer et al. 2005; Stevenson 2014). While this
hasn’t been directly tested in the non-multisensory olfactory case, it is very plausible
that something similar would apply. I take this to be indirect evidence of the law of
proximity applying in the case of olfaction.
Principle of Good Form Another principle that is worth considering is the principle
of good form or “Prägnanz”—an overarching Gestalt principle that is often said to
6 These kinds of simple visual examples have the potential to be misleading. In the case of grouping
together dots, the individual dots may themselves be perceived as figures against a background in some cases
(presumably based in part on further grouping principles), but they are also often perceptually combined
into larger perceived objects. Thus, it may be ambiguous whether we perceive an individual dot as a figure
against a background or the larger grouping of dots as a figure (perhaps like cases of bi-stable figure-ground
perception such as Rubin’s “vase-or-face” image, which can be perceived according to two distinct figure-
ground interpretations). In many cases, however, there isn’t such an ambiguity. Plausibly, part of the reason
we perceive a tomato as a unified, bounded object is because of the similar shades of red across different
parts of it. In such cases we don’t perceive one patch of the tomato as itself a figure against a background,
even though it may be possible to attend to one patch of it. Likewise, in the case of olfactory grouping by
similarity, the perception is of a unified odour, and even if it may be possible in some instances to attend
to different aspects of the odour, these aspects don’t seem to be segregated from the whole. Thanks to an
anonymous referee for pushing me on this issue.
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encompass the other grouping principles. This states that we are more likely perceptu-
ally group together assemblies of parts that are coherent, balanced, simple, and so forth.
We generally group together elements into the simplest and most internally coherent
figures that are compatible with the available sensory information. Intuitively, good
form is something that can be achieved in the olfactory domain. Perfumery provides an
example of this, and suggests that good form aids in the grouping of odours. Perfume
manufacturers seek to develop well-balanced fragrances, combining top, middle and
base notes to obtain a perfume accord. An accord is a blend of notes that produces a
harmonious odour, in which the notes lose their individual identity and are perceived
as unified. Perfume accords are plausibly bounded and segregated from other scents,
and good form seems to be an important factor in achieving this. The balance, harmony
and internal coherence exhibited by these accords is crucial to the perception a unified
scent.
These examples highlight that several of the Gestalt principles apply in the case of
olfaction, influencing whether we perceive olfactory features as unified and discrete.
This doesn’t look like mere experiential prominence but rather, olfactory experience
seems to be organised in ways analogous to in the other senses. Thus, there is good
reason to apply the notion of figure-ground segregation to olfactory perception. Impor-
tantly, if the evidence I have provided does indicate that the several of the Gestalt
principles apply to smell (thus providing evidence for figure-ground segregation),
they seem to apply in a non-spatial manner. In the next section, I will argue that in
addition to this type of figure-ground segregation, olfaction also exhibits a form of
spatial figure-ground segregation.
3.2 Figure-ground segregation and the spatiality of olfaction
We have seen that there are reasons to think that, as in the auditory case, there is a non-
spatial form of figure-ground segregation in olfaction. However, some researchers
have rejected the idea of non-spatial figure-ground segregation, suggesting that the
notion should be reserved for instances of spatial discrimination (which is usually
thought to preclude olfaction). Batty (2014b) argues that we need a spatial account of
figure-ground segregation in order to make interesting comparisons between human
and non-human olfactory perceptions. In particular, it is clear that some animals have
a directional sense of smell. Batty notes that the hammerhead shark’s sense of smell
enables it to immediately turn in the direction of the source of a blood odour (p. 10).
Moreover, its nasal cavities are far apart, giving it a stereo sense of smell. According
to Batty, the shark’s sense of smell can rightly be said to involve a kind of (spatial)
figure-ground segregation, while ours cannot. She says, “If we are to account for the
difference between us and the hammerhead, then, we require the spatial notion of
figure-ground segregation” (ibid.). This ability to immediately detect the direction
from which the blood arrives is, she claims, analogous to our ability to detect the
location of a sound in audition (ibid.).
Batty’s argument is primarily pragmatic; it is based on the alleged utility of reserv-
ing the term “figure-ground segregation” for spatial types of perception. Extending
the term to non-spatial cases, she thinks, threatens its usefulness in accounting for
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differences between varied types of perception (such as human olfaction and that of
the shark). As we have seen, Bregman (1990) and others have claimed that there are
important notions of figure-ground segregation that aren’t reliant on spatial features,
allowing us, for example, to make sense of how we perceive distinct sound streams.
While audition does, as Batty notes, enable us to spatially locate objects and events
in the environment, it also appears to be governed by a myriad of Gestalt grouping
principles that are heavily reliant on temporal and non-spatial features. These princi-
ples provide evidence of non-spatial figure-ground effects in audition. Furthermore,
we have seen that at least some of these Gestalt principles apply to olfaction also.
Nevertheless, even if one were to reserve the notion of figure-ground segregation for
spatial cases, we will see that it can still apply to olfactory experience. Thus, here
I also disagree with Wilson and Stevenson (2006, 2007) and Carvalho (2014), who
think only non-spatial figure-ground segregation occurs in olfaction, and others such
as Lycan (2000) and Matthen (2005) who reject any kind of figure-ground segregation
in olfaction. In what follows, I will respond to Batty and argue that spatial olfactory
figure-ground segregation is at least sometimes achieved. In order to see that olfac-
tion does provide us with spatial information, we need to first understand that bodily
activity is required to have any kind of olfactory experience and that tactile inputs can
give rise to olfactory phenomenology.
A clear sense in which olfaction involves (a minimal kind of) bodily movement is
through the act of sniffing. Empirical research demonstrates that the act of inhalation is
necessary to have any olfactory experience whatsoever. Proetz (1941) highlighted the
necessity of airflow through the nostrils by pouring a solution of eau de cologne into
the nostrils of his students, noting that this did not give rise to an olfactory perception:
“Although it obviously reaches his olfactory area he will not detect the odor” (p. 366).
Further evidence for the necessity of the inhalation comes from Bocca et al. (1965),
who intravenously injected odorants into subjects. Odorants were delivered to the
epithelium via the blood stream, but subjects did not perceive any odour except for
when they sniffed and breathed normally through the nose. Thus, the act of inhalation
is crucial for olfactory experience, with some taking the sniff to be “as integral to
olfactory perception as the eye movement is to visual perception” (Mainland and
Sobel 2006, p. 1). In addition, evidence suggests that multiple sniffs are needed to
differentiate odours (Mainland and Sobel 2006). Thus, we ought to acknowledge the
role of this kind of temporally extended olfactory exploration in considering whether
figure-ground segregation is achieved.
Active sniffing also appears to offer us more spatial information than has gener-
ally been supposed. A conservative endorsement of spatiality in olfactory experience
comes from Louise Richardson (2013). She argues that the act of sniffing causes us to
perceive smell in an exteroceptive manner: we perceive odours as being brought into
the nose from the outside. In this way, smell differs from bodily sensations like pain,
for example. Richardson doesn’t think that distance and direction are represented in
olfactory experiences, claiming that they are more akin to the tactile experience of
a breeze blowing against your face: “One is not aware of some distance that the air
that touches your face has travelled. But nevertheless, it does seem as if the breeze
is coming to the body from somewhere beyond it—from without” (p. 411). This is
an interesting analogy because it appears to actually highlight nearly the opposite of
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what Richardson claims. We can learn about direction (although perhaps not distance)
from air blowing into your face. Wind might hit my left cheek, but not my right cheek,
giving me information about which direction it is coming from. Something similar
might hold in certain cases of olfaction.
In fact, Roberts (2015) uses this line of thought—and a similar example—in arguing
in favour of spatial content in olfaction. He asserts:
Firstly, consider that some odours arrive on the breeze, and are experienced
as such. Directional ventilation can add a dimension of spatial content that is
missing in olfactory encounters with static air, permitting the subject to smell
where an odour is coming from. A scent that is carried by a current that is felt
upon the left hand side of one’s face can, plausibly, be perceptually localised to
that direction… (p. 408)
The example of odours carried on a breeze seems to show that there can be directional
content in olfaction. This goes beyond the exteroceptivity that Richardson highlights,
illustrating the beginnings of a more robust account of spatial olfaction.
As well as the case of odours arriving on a breeze, there are empirical studies that
indicate that we can gain some directional information through smelling by stimula-
tion of the trigeminal nerve (Kobal et al. 1989)—a nerve involved in activity such as
chewing and responsible for (what are usually considered to be) tactile and pain sen-
sations in the face. It might be protested that these directional experiences aren’t truly
olfactory, given the involvement of trigeminal or other types of tactile (in the breeze
case) stimulation. However, as Roberts (ibid.) points out, it seems to be a mistake to
think that there is ever “pure olfaction” devoid of input from the other senses (p. 418,
fn. 17). As we have seen, the act of smelling always involves bodily movement in the
form of the sniff, which like the experience of a breeze hitting us, involves a degree
of tactile stimulation. If we agree with Richardson that our olfactory experiences are
exteroceptive, this seems to crucially involve the experience of the inhalation of air
through the nostrils. This exteroceptivity is a vital aspect of olfactory phenomenology,
but one that depends upon tactile input.
Likewise, many smells rely on trigeminal stimulation for their perceived quality.
For example, the cool scent of menthol, the pungency of ammonia and the acridity
of burning rubber are all reliant on trigeminal stimulation. Yet these do seem to be
features of odours, we detect them by sniffing, and they seem to present themselves as
olfactory properties. Our experiences of these properties seem to undermine the idea
that we can neatly carve off olfactory phenomenology from tactile phenomenology.
It might be thought that considering anosmia, where patients have lost their sense of
smell, would allow us to isolate the trigeminal from the olfactory aspects of experience.
However, in fact this doesn’t provide a clear way to separate the two because anosmia
also comes with a decrease in trigeminal sensitivity (Hummel et al. 1996), illustrating
the tight connection between olfactory and trigeminal stimulation in smell. Trigeminal
stimulation is ubiquitous in our normal olfactory experiences and the vast majority of
odorants also stimulate the trigeminal nerve (e.g. Wysocki et al. 2003).
There have also been interesting experiments demonstrating that humans have a
capacity for tracking odour trails. Porter et al. (2007) show that we are in fact able
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to track odour trails using smell alone (participants were blindfolded, given sound-
blocking earmuffs etc.).7 Accuracy dropped significantly when the subjects had one
nostril taped up, and when a device was used to combine airflow so both nostrils
received the same information. This suggests that our bilateral nostrils play a role
in the spatial information derived from olfaction: “Here we find that mammals per-
forming a scent-tracking task, freely able to move their nose and sample the olfactory
environment in real time, reap added benefit from sampling via their two spatially
offset nostrils” (p. 29). They conclude that we are able to spatially localise odorants.
In this case, it is very plausible that the subjects experience the scent trail as a figure
against a background—a case of olfactory figure-ground segregation that is achieved
spatially. Whether we move our bodies to seek out the scents that we inhale, or whether
the air is brought to us on a breeze, we can garner spatial information from olfaction.
Now we are in a position to re-consider Batty’s (2014b) shark example. Batty infers
a spatial type of perception from the shark’s abilities, taking hammerhead sharks to
have a directional sense of smell because they have the ability to immediately turn in the
direction of the source of a blood odour, for example (p. 10), as well as noting that their
offset nostrils allow stereo smell. Yet Batty’s ‘abstract’ account of human olfaction
requires that we assess the phenomenology of a motionless perceiver. She says: “If
we bracket information gained from movement and any other sensory modality, and
consider olfactory experience at-a-time, then we see that any locatedness of these
properties—other than simply ‘here’—goes as well” (2010a, p. 9). As we have seen,
the idea that olfactory properties are simply instantiated ‘here’ is central to her account,
highlighting that she believes that bracketing off movement and information from the
other senses is the correct approach to understanding human olfaction. Batty says “it
would be strange to conclude that the hammerhead’s olfactory experiences are to be
evaluated according to one notion of figure-ground segregation, while ours are not”
(2014b, p. 10). However, human scent tracking also involves differential stimulation
of the nostrils and Porter, et al.’s research seems to suggest clear similarities in the
perceptual abilities of humans and sharks. Participants in the study moved their heads
in such a way as to follow the odour trail, from which we can infer the sort of spatial
phenomenology that Batty claims is the preserve of non-human animals. Thus, there
doesn’t seem to be a reason to accept evidence for figure-ground segregation from a
shark’s abilities but not from those of a human. If the hammerhead shark’s sense of
smell is said to involve figure-ground segregation, it seems that (at least) in certain
circumstances human olfaction does so too.
In fact, a key role of olfaction is to spatially localise the sources of odours, and
exploratory sniffing also allows us to track the direction from which some odours
7 Again, some researchers are likely to argue that this isn’t an example of “pure” olfaction. Lycan, who, as I
have mentioned, claims olfaction is aspatial, would disagree with this account of spatial content in olfaction
because he thinks that spatial information derived from sniffing while moving our heads or bodies wouldn’t
count as spatial content from olfaction itself (personal communication). His focus is only on whether there
is spatial content in smell when we don’t move around. However, once we recognise that some bodily
movement is a requirement for having any olfactory experience whatsoever, it is a small step to accept
that ordinary olfactory experience involves exploratory sniffing. We move our heads towards roses to smell
them, we move away from bad smells, we lift the coffee cup towards our noses to smell its odour, and so
forth.
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arrive. We don’t only perceive odours as exteroceptive through olfaction, but can
also learn about direction and other spatial features of odours, which may assist us in
segregating them. Thus, contra researchers like Batty (2011, 2014b), Lycan (2000) and
Matthen (2005) it appears that we do have spatial discriminatory abilities in olfaction.
By adopting this approach to olfaction, we can also take insights from the process-
based accounts of olfaction (mentioned in Sect. 1) while retaining a robust notion of
objecthood. Barwich (2014) says that we ought to reject the notion of perceptual objects
because researchers treat them as static units of analysis, independent of perceptual
processes (p. 264). However, with the proposed approach we can see that perceptual
objects are crucially dependent upon perceptual processes. Without bodily movement,
we cannot perceive objects at all, and moving our heads and bodies can give us rich
spatial information about odours, allowing us to spatially segregate them from complex
mixtures of odorants in the air.
The preceding discussion’s emphasis on the role of tactile and trigeminal stimu-
lation in olfactory phenomenology opens up interesting questions about whether we
ought to take olfactory experience to be multimodal (perhaps similar to how flavour
perception is often understood). In my view, there are three main ways to construe
olfaction here: (a) as a multimodal type of perception involving olfactory, tactile and
trigeminal sense modalities, (b) as a unimodal type of perception, which takes the
tactile/trigeminal involvement to merely influence olfaction rather than forming part
of the olfactory experience itself, or (c) as a unimodal type of perception that takes
the tactile and trigeminal involvement to form a constitutive part of a unified olfactory
sense modality/perceptual modality. How this question is answered will depend on the
way in which the senses are individuated.8 There have been extremely wide-ranging
approaches to this issue. Traditionally, most approaches have based individuation on
either the phenomenal character of a sense experience, types of receptors, the sense
organ involved or the representational content of the experience (Macpherson 2011b),
and others have suggested we individuate the senses on the basis of types of perceptual
activity (Matthen 2015) or societal convention (Nudds 2004). These different strate-
gies for individuating the senses will result in different answers to the question of
whether olfactory experience is multimodal.9 Although these questions goes beyond
8 See Macpherson (2011a) for an introduction to different approaches to individuating the senses and see
Richardson (2013) for discussion of the exteroceptivity of olfaction and its implications for the debate on
individuating the senses.
9 For example, if the senses are individuated on the basis of the phenomenal character of the associated
experiences or on the basis of perceptual activity (e.g. sniffing, tracking odour sources etc.), olfactory expe-
riences could be considered unimodal in character (option c). With this approach, the tactile and trigeminal
elements would play a constitutive role in the sense of smell (if it is agreed that there is no clear way to
abstract olfactory phenomenology/types of worldly engagement away from the tactile/trigeminal aspects).
Whereas, if the senses were individuated (for example) on the basis of the type of receptors that are being
stimulated, this would most likely lead to either option (a) or (b) depending on exactly how one thinks that
senses individuated on the basis of receptor types relate to conscious olfactory experience. If one thinks that
olfactory experience depends (constitutively) upon all the receptors that are characteristically stimulated
when one smells something, olfactory experience would be multimodal, involving several different sense
modalities (option a). If one thinks that olfactory experience is merely influenced causally by tactile and
trigeminal stimulation, but that there is not a constitutive relationship between them, then olfactory experi-
ence would not be multimodal (option b). For what it’s worth, my own preference on this issue is for option
(c), treating olfaction as a unified perceptual system individuated on the basis of bodily activity.
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the scope of the current discussion, this would be a worthwhile avenue for future
exploration.
With the account I have put forward, odours are presented to us as spatiotemporally
extended entities. Even though they have less clearly specified spatial boundaries than
the objects presented in, say, vision, they do allow spatial differentiation when we
actively engage in the activity of smelling. There is good evidence that figure-ground
segregation applies in olfaction: it is possible to discriminate odours both on the basis
of non-spatial and spatial factors. Batty (2014b) argues against the presentation of
particular objects in olfaction because of the alleged lack of figure-ground segregation,
so a key argument in favour of the abstract view fails. Similar considerations would
hold against the feature-based view prevalent in the olfactory sciences; we have seen
that there is good reason to think that olfaction involves the experience of discrete
structured wholes, rather than disjointed properties. However, to assess whether there
are olfactory objects, we must also determine whether olfaction involves perceptual
constancies.
3.3 Perceptual constancies in olfaction
In the previous sections, I discussed two ways in which figure-ground segregation
is exhibited in olfaction. We saw that figure-ground segregation alone, however, is
not sufficient for the exhibition of particular objects in experience. If perceptual con-
stancies are also exhibited in olfactory experiences, olfaction will meet the criteria
for the perception of particular objects. For robust object perception, I have claimed,
we require more than a mere moment-by-moment individuation of odours; we also
need these odours to retain their identity across change (involving object recognition
capacities).
It has been claimed that olfaction doesn’t involve perceptual constancies (e.g. Burge
2009). However, there is evidence to the contrary. One type of constancy in olfaction
is our ability to “fill in” compounds. We are able to perceive odours as the odour-type
that they are, even if they are corrupted or missing elements due to poor perceptual
conditions (Barnes et al. 2008; see Carvalho 2014 for a discussion of this type of
constancy). We perceive a coffee odour as a coherent whole, which retains its identity,
even if the precise odorants that stimulate the nasal cavity don’t include all 600 chem-
ical elements that typify a coffee odour. We recognise it as a coffee odour even if the
particular compounds that we are in contact with vary. It is thought that this is a result
of object-recognition processes (Stevenson 2011, p. 1892). This seems analogous to
the sort of visual object-recognition that allows us to see objects as complete, even
though we only have direct sensory contact with their facing sides and in cases where
they are partially occluded.
Another type of perceptual constancy in olfaction relates to intensity. The size of
sniff that one takes has a significant effect on the neural response of the olfactory
nerve, but does not result in significant changes to the apparent intensity of an odour
(Teghtsoonian and Teghtsoonian 1982). We seem able to perceive an invariant feature
of an odour—its intensity—even though our perspectives on the world change. This
appears to be related to an awareness of how one’s own sniffing activity will influence
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the olfactory stimuli that reaches the olfactory epithelium. Crucially, when the changes
to airflow rate are not controlled by the subject, there is no such constancy effect and
there is a perceived change to odour intensity, highlighting again the importance of
bodily activity (here, in terms of the effect of effort expended when sniffing) in olfactory
perception (Hahn et al. 1994). There are perceptual constancies in olfaction as in the
other sensory modalities.
In Sect. 2.2 I noted that in the cases of perceptual constancy exhibited in visual
experience, there is generally a kind of duality to the phenomenology of the experience.
There is a sense in which one tree looks smaller than the other, and the plate looks
elliptical, but in another more robust sense, the trees look the same size and the plate
looks round. Could something like this apply to the olfactory constancies discussed
above? In the case of intensity constancy, it is clear to me that it does. There is a sense
in which if I take a big sniff of coffee and a small sniff of coffee, I can notice that there
is, in a way, a different intensity to the experience, but at the same time I perceive the
coffee odour as having an invariant intensity.
In the case of “filling-in”, it is a little more difficult to see how this kind of duality
could apply, but I still think that there is a case to me made for something like this
applying to olfactory phenomenology. This case is analogous to the visual case of
seeing an object as complete even though we only see its facing side, or it is partially
occluded by something. In the visual case, there is a sense in which the object appears
as a whole object even though in another sense we recognise that we only see part of it.
Perhaps in the case of olfaction, one could recognise that not all of the properties typical
of the coffee odour are apparent at once (picking out, say, the fruitiness and yet needing
to move closer to coffee cup to pick out the chocolate notes), and yet still also recognise
the coffee odour as complete and unified in another sense. Plausibly, an expert coffee
taster would be better at picking out these perspective-dependent olfactory properties,
just as an experienced artist is better able to pick out the angles and shapes apparent
from a perspective. Yet, the unified coffee odour—like the objective shape of the
plate—will generally be easier to pick out than the particular properties apparent at
each moment.
If we accept the role of tactile stimulation and bodily movement in olfactory phe-
nomenology, we can see that olfaction involves both figure-ground segregation and
perceptual constancies, and thus fulfils the criteria I laid out for a robust type of
perceptual objecthood. This object-based approach improves upon the abstract and
feature-based approaches, which usually rely on the claim that olfaction is aspatial
and can’t exhibit figure-ground effects. With my suggested approach, we can appre-
ciate the important ways in which olfaction is similar to other varieties of perception,
providing us rich information about the world.
Conclusion
In this paper I argued that olfaction allows the perception of particular, discrete objects
in the form of odours. I argued that figure-ground segregation and perceptual constan-
cies are the hallmarks of the perception of particular objects, providing individually
necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. We saw that there is empirical evidence
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that the Gestalt principles of similarity, proximity and good form apply in the case of
olfaction, suggesting that there is a non-spatial variety of figure-ground segregation
exhibited by smell. Additionally, however, we saw that olfaction involves a second,
spatial type of figure-ground segregation and olfaction is experienced in spatial man-
ner. The figure-ground structure and spatiality of olfactory experience is especially
evident when we pay attention to the role of tactile stimulation and bodily movement in
olfactory experience. Furthermore, there is empirical and phenomenological evidence
of perceptual constancies in olfaction, which together with figure-ground segregation,
fulfils the criteria for a robust kind of perceptual objecthood that goes beyond the
weak, abstract notion of objecthood or the perception of nebulous features.
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